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Unemployment and education in an overlapping-generations
economic growth model
IKEDA Ryoichi
We introduce labor unions and unemployment into an overlapping-
generations model with endogenous fertility and endogenous growth and
consider the cost of time spent child-rearing. A tax subsidy for education has
no effect on fertility and the existence of a threshold at which the growth rate
is maximized owing to unemployment and the funding of education is
financed through income tax. The threshold is lower than those in previous
studies because this model incorporates unemployment, whereas previous
research assumes full employment. The ineffectiveness of education tax
against fertility may arise as the cost of time spent child-rearing is a constant.
Keywords: fertility, unemployment, economic growth, overlapping-
generations model
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1. Introduction
Education and economic growth present an interesting combination of topics to
macroeconomists. Pioneering studies of education and economic growth include the
models proposed by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992,1997). In developed countries such
as Japan, both a low fertility rate and a high unemployment rate are issues of public
concern. However, Glomm and Ravikumar's (1992,1997) model considers the fertility
rate and (un)employment rate as exogenous. Zhang and Casagrande (1998) show
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empirical evidence that a rise in per capita educational subsidies does not increase
fertility but does increase the growth rate. As Zhang and Casagrande (1998) point out,
subsidizing education reduces its cost and increases the relative cost of child-rearing.
However, if the subsidy for education is financed by (fiat) income tax, then it would
reduce the cost of child-rearing by lowering the opportunity cost of spending time on
rearing children. Overall, the two opposing effects cancel out each other. Eventually,
the subsidy for education would have no effect on fertility.
Zhang and Casagrande (1998) do not consider unemployment. However, many
developed countries experienced high unemployment in the early 21 century. Ahn and
Mira (2002) show that unemployment has a stronger income effect than a substitution
effect. Relatively high and persistent unemployment is explained, in part, by a
combination of high income tax and a strong labor union. Additionally, Daveri and
Tabellini (2000) show the correlation between the income tax rate and unemployment
rate."
Thus, if the subsidy for education is financed by income tax, then it would be necessary
to examine what happens to unemployment, fertility, and economic growth. Likewise,
it would be imperative to investigate if higher unemployment rates caused by a high
income tax are associated with lower fertility. Furthermore, it is also relevant to study
if the economic growth rate is affected by a high unemployment rate.
Fanti and Gori (2010) consider fertility as endogenous and report interesting results.
However, their model considers both the economic growth rate and the unemployment
rate as exogenous. As mentioned above, macroeconomists tend to believe that education
In Japan, the ratio of organized labor is only 17 percent, according to a basic survey of labor unions
by Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. However, in Japan, Shunto, a large labor
negotiation, affects the wages of many companies that do not have labor unions. Additionally,
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) show thai labor unions' wage negotiation hypothesis holds in many
developed countries including Japan. Therefore, even in a country in which the ratio of organized
labor is low, such as Japan, we can state that labor unions' wage negotiation hypothesis holds at
least partly.
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is an engine of economic growth. Their model would be more interesting if the growth
rate was endogenous, as in Zhang and Casagrande (1998).
Additionally, Fanti and Gori's (2010) model assumes that the unemployment rate
is given (zero). However, especially in Japan, a high unemployment rate and a low
economic growth rate pose a problem to policymakers. A better result could be obtained
if the correlation between the unemployment rate and growth rate is revealed. As
mentioned earlier, without unemployment, a subsidy for education financed by income
tax would have no effect. However, if unemployment exists, does it still have no effect?
In this study, we consider an endogenous economic growth rate by extending the
research of Fanti and Gori (2010) in which the rate of growth is exogenous. They
introduce public education in their model. Public education, comprising both primary
and secondary education, is an important part of education in many developed countries
such as Japan. We assume that education is solely delivered by the public sector. We
also consider the unemployment rate as endogenous, following Daveri and Tabellini
(2000). We prove the existence of a threshold at which the growth rate is maximized,
since investment in education is financed by income tax and unemployment exists.
From this perspective, this study extends the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997)
with endogenous unemployment and birth rates. By introducing physical capital, this
study can be considered as an extension of Zhang and Casagrande (1997). Additionally,




Consider a two-period overlapping-generations model in which a representative
household in t generation (/ period) has preferences defined by cij, C2,f+i, and
W/, that is, consumption during youth, consumption at old age, and number of children
(i.e., birth rate), respectively, following previous studies such as Fanti and Gori (2010).
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max (1 - 0)lnci,, + plnc2,,+i + rn
C|./.C2,f+l."r ^ ^
Here, 0 < 0 < 1 is the parameter of the utility function and 0 < p < 1 is the time
preference.
The government collects a tax on labor income and lump-sum taxes, where the tax
rate on labor income is 0 < ̂  < 1 and the lump-sum tax rate is t,. The youth earn
income as follows: a worker in his/her youth is employed with probability /,. A young
worker obtains after-tax income of (1 - 0) (1 - mn) ht /, vv, - T/, where h, is per capita
human capital. However, he/she has periods in which he/she resigns for childcare or
avails childcare leave. He/she uses some of the available time (deftned as unity)
where w > 0 is the cost of raising a child per young person. If he/she is not employed,
he/she collects unemployment benefit (1 - //)Pf (P/ is the unemployment benefit).
Therefore, his/her income in youth is (1 - 0) (1 - m/i,) - t, + (1 - It)Pt-
Some of this income is consumed in youth, that is, t'l./, and the rest is saved, that is.
In his/her old age, he/she consumes (1 + r,+i)^, with interest Therefore,
his/her budget constraints during his/her youth and old age are given by
c, +St = (1 -0)(1 -mn,)htw,l, -t, +{l -lt)p,
and
= (1+r,+i)5,, (2)
respectively. From (2), the lifetime budget constraint is
Ct + C2.r+i = (1 -0)(1 -mn,)htWtl, - r, + (1 - l,)p,
1 -I- /-,+! • W;
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Maximizing his/her utility subject to (3), savings, Sj, and number of children per
household, Wf, are derived as follows;
St = [(1 - 0)h,wil, - T, + (1 - li)p,] (4)
and
«/ = 7-7 7j——((1 -9)htl,Wt+{l-l,)pt-T), (5)
1 + pm(l -6)htltWt
respectively.
Equation (4) indicates that a representative household's savings, St, are a proportion
of (1 - 8) htWtIt -Tt + (1 - li)pt, which is the income when he/she has no children.
2.2 Firm
A representative firm maximizes its profit
max AKf {{l - mnt)htltL{)^ - (1 + r,) - (1 - mn,)/i,/,w,L,, (6)
in which Kt is the capital stock, /i, is the quality of an employee (which improves with
education), /, is the employment rate, Lt is the population, r, is the interest rate (we
assume that the capital stock decreases in a term), w, is the wage rate per efficient unit
of labor, 0 < or < 1 is the capital share (i.e., 1 - a is the labor share), and A is the
scale parameter. By dividing equation (6) by Lt, the equation can be expressed as
10 {2020if-em
maxAkf{{l-mn,)htl,) " - {\ + r,) ki - {I - mtit) htlfWt. (7)
ktJi
Maximizing its profit, the first-order conditions of (7) are
1 +r/ =Q'A^f"'((l - mrit) htltY'"
(1 -a)Ak"i{l -mn,)h,l,)~" = vv,. (8)
Equation (9) is also the firm's labor demand function, which can be solved in terms of
h, that is.
^  ;{l-a)A\" kr
'  ' Wf j (1 - mtif) ht'





We describe the behavior of the labor union. For simplicity, all individuals belong to
the labor union. We assume that this labor union is sufficiently strong to determine
wages, but not to determine lump-sum tax T/, unemployment benefit /?,, labor income
tax 9 , or interest rate O." The labor union maximizes a union member's expected
-  We assume that the labor union has a 'myopic view' because it does not consider the fact that the
labor income tax and lump-sum tax are affected by wages.
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income (1 - 0) (1 - mrit) htWth - t + (1 - It) Pt subject to (10). Taking interest rate
O as given, this is equivalent to maximizing labor union members' indirect utility
V ((1 - 0) (1 - ntrit) hiWflt - t + (1 - If)Pt). Solving the union's maximization
problem, we derive the following equation:
{\-0)(\-a)(l-nin,y
Equation (11) equates a union member's wage times his/her human capital with the
product of unemployment benefit Pt and some mark-up ratio
1 /[(1 - 0) (1 - a) (1 - mrit)]. Unemployment benefit Pt is assumed to be a proportion
of product per capita, that is, SAk^ ((1 - mtit) htlt)^~". From this and equation (8),
employment rate /, is derived:
,, = (12)
2.4 Government
2.4.1. Unemployment benefit. Unemployment benefit Pi is financed by lump-sum tax
Tf. A proportion of product per capita 6Aky ((1 - mn) hflt)^ (where t, is a variable
and 5 is a constant) is paid to unemployed workers. That is,
L,r, = i, (1 - 1,)P, =L,{1- l,)SAk° ((1 - mtOhM'-". (13)
From equations (4) and (13),
1+p (14)
12 o- (2020^1--6 1^)
and
<t> 1
'' = 1 . (15)\ + pm
which is constant.
2.4.2. Education. The government provides education g, > 0 to children financed by
the labor income tax. For simplicity, we describe the government's budget constraint
per young person. Then,
g, =e{\-mn)h,l,\v,. (16)
3. Equilibrium: results
3.1 Human and physical capital
Human capital per capita at time t + 1, /i,+i, depends on time t, h,, as well as the
education the government provides, gi:
A,+i = Bh^g'-'' = Bl^(0(l-mn)h,l,w,)'-''. (17)
Here, S is a scale parameter of education and 0 < < 1 is a technical parameter of
education.
In the equilibrium, the capital stock satisfies Kt+\ = 5, = SfL,. Divided by L[, that
is, the population at time t, the capital stock becomes Wf/^r+i = s,. Furthermore, from
equations (5) and (14), the capital stock becomes
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kt+X = -6)h,l,w,, (18)
which does not converge in one period, as seen in Fanti and Gori (2010). Therefore,
this economy has transition dynamics, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).
Following Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), and from equations (17) and (18),
^1^ , which is a constant in the equilibrium, is




IS a constantwhere e = — (I - m/.)'-""-"! (1 - a)'" A'" ('' )
A  \ ^ I I,
unaffected by labor income tax rate . From the fact that 0 < a < 1 and 0 < /i < 1, r
converges at a steady state:
^ = Q (1 - 6) 0'-'^ (I - ̂) (1 - 0)^^
I  -(!+;<( I-«))
= Q '-"f 0 i-tf/' (1 — 0) 1-^#'
(20)
It is necessary to interpret equation (20). If labor income tax 0 increases, ratio x
increases because of a decrease in physical capital k . The second term implies that
the increase in 0 increases government spending g, human capital h , and ratio x.
The third term implies that the increase in 0 decreases employment ratio / and physical
capital k and then increases x. The fourth term implies that the increase in 0 spurs
the labor union to hike wage vv and savings s, while the physical capital stock k
increases and x relatively decreases. The first and second terms are affected by the
14 i20W6H)
change in employment ratio /, whereas the third and fourth terms are not affected by
the change in I. This classification is used in Section 4. Moreover, birth rate n is a
constant and labor income tax rate 0 has no impact on it.
3.2 Employment rate
By solving equation (12), we derive
/, = (21)





Owing to the increase in the labor income tax, labor unions demand higher wages,
which decrease a firm's willingness to hire and thereby increase the unemployment
rate.
3.3 Effect on fertility
We can easily investigate the effect of education (or income tax for education).
Proposition 1. Public education does not affect the fertility rate.
Proof. This is evident from equation .
Zhang and Casagrande (1997) prove that income tax for education has two opposite
effects. First, it reduces the cost of education and increases the relative cost of raising
a child. Then, it reduces the number of children. This is an inverse relationship between
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the number of children and quality of children.^ Second, income tax for education
reduces the opportunity cost of spending time on rearing children; therefore, it increases
the number of children (another effect overlooked by previous studies). Third, it reduces
the rate of employment. It also reduces the opportunity cost of raising children, which
increases the number of children. The negative effect for fertility and the positive effects
cancel out completely. Therefore, income tax for education has no effect.
3.4 Effect on the growth rate
In this section, we extend the study of Fanti and Gori (2010) to not only the
(un)employment rate but also the growth rate. This enables us to analyze the effects of
an increase in the labor income tax for education. From equations (8), (12), (18), and
(20), the growth rate is calculated as
g = In kt+\ - In fc, = 5 + (1 - or) In <9 + (1 - a) In jc, (22)
where
5 = In (1 - or) A (1 - mn)~" + ̂ ^InQ is a constant unaffected by labor
<p I - a/j
income tax rate 6 .
Differentiating equation (22) with regard to labor income tax rate 6 , we derive the
following propositions.
Proposition 2. When labor income tax rate 6 is sufficiently low, that is, 0 < 9 ,an
increase in labor income tax rate 9 raises the growth rate.
In this study, the representative household does not choose between the quality and quantity of
children. However, as human capital rises, the cost of child-rearing also rises and hence the number
of children reduces. We cannot say that this is a choice between the quality and quantity of children;
however, there is an inverse relationship between the quality and quantity of children.
16 5;- (2020^:61^)
Proposition 3. 0 is always lower than that shown in Glomm and Ravikumar (1997),
in which the threshold rate is the labor distribution rate of the production function.
Proof. Differentiating equation (22) with regard to labor income tax rate 6 ,
^>Oif
de
(1 - ar)(l — /r)(l - 6) - 9[{2 - ar)(l - a^) - (1 - 0')(1 + (1 - a))] > 0.
From this,
\ — (X - dgif0 < 2—~ ̂  ̂ ^ In this study, from equation (6), the labor distribution
rate is 1 - cr. Considering 0 < (r < 1, it is obvious that 0 < 1 - a. To investigate
the propositions, from equation (18), we can also express the growth rate as
g = In^f+i -Inkt = In + ln(l - 0) + In jc + In / + In w
<f>
= In — + In (1 - a)A (1 - mn)~" + In (1 - 0) + Inx + In / - aln jc - aln/.
0
(23)
Differentiating equation with respect to 0 yields
dg 1 ^ rflnA: , d\ul
In equation (24), (1) the first term on the right-hand side implies the income effect
of labor income tax 0 , which is negative. (2) The second term implies the human
capital-physical capital ratio effect, which is positive, as mentioned above. (3) The
third term implies the employment ratio effect, which is negative.
Why does the fertility change have no effect in line with Zhang (1997)? Owing to
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the increase in Proposition 1, the increase in income tax has no effect on fertility.
Therefore, there is no effect through fertility.
Overall, effects (1) and (3) are negative and effects (2) are positive. If labor income
tax 6 is sufficiently low, the positive effect dominates. If 0 is too high, the negative
effect dominates, that is, the growth rate falls. For this reason, threshold 6 exists.
We need to interpret Proposition 3. If it were not for the unemployment effect, the
growth-maximizing threshold would be similar to that of Glomm and Ravikumar
(1997). Therefore, the effect caused by the change in employment ratio 9 decreases
the growth rate and threshold of 9 . For this reason, threshold 9 is smaller than that
in Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).
From Propositions 1,2, and 3, we can conclude that public education is important
for economic growth, but spending excess budget on public education is not good for
economic growth. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) propose this conclusion, but in this
study, unemployment also decreases the growth rate and growth-maximizing tax rate.
4. Simulation
We can validate the above conclusion using a simple simulation. We set the deep
parameters as follows: 0 = 0.9, p = 0.1,m = 0.1,a' = 0.33, 6 = 0.45, p = 0.75, and
B = 2. Then, 9 = 0.401. We set income tax rate 9 = 0.05,0.1, • • •, 0.9,0.95 and use
equations (12), (15), and (22) for the simulation.
From Figure 1, we can see 9 < 9 and easily confirm that Proposition 2 is true.
From Figure 2, we can see that employment rate / is a decreasing function of income
tax rate 9 .
From Figure 3, we can see that growth rate g is an inverse U-shaped function of 9 .
If 0 0, g is an increasing function of 9 . When 9 = 9- 0.401, g is at its maximum
and therefore g = 0.077. By contrast, if 0 > 0, g decreases as 9 increases. We can
also confirm Proposition 2. It is obvious that the rate is lower than that of Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997), where the threshold is 0.67 = 1 — a. We can also see that Proposition















Figure 2. Employment rate













Figure 3. Growth rate
3 holds.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Growth and fertility rates are often examined in a conventional manner, as in previous
studies of education and economic growth. However, in developed countries such as
Japan, a high unemployment rate and a low fertility rate are issues of public concern.
Evidencing this point, this study shows that a growth-maximizing income tax rate exists
for labor and that this tax rate is always lower than that shown by Glomm and Ravikumar
(1997) owing to the impact of unemployment. It seems interesting that unemployment
has no effect on fertility.
We can conclude that unemployment does not have a direct effect on fertility.
However, it is harmful to economic growth. Previous studies do not consider the negative
effects of unemployment, which may impact on the findings of these studies. This
context gives rise to the question of why unemployment has no effect on fertility,
contrary to the findings presented by Ahn and Mira (2002). We suppose that the child-
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rearing cost per young person /n is a constant. If we suppose that m is an increasing
function of employment ratio /, then fertility n would be a decreasing function of
employment.''
As mentioned above, we assume a log-linear utility function and that the child-rearing
cost is a constant. While these assumptions are essential for simplicity, in the real-world
economy, a log-linear utility function and constant child-rearing cost may not hold. A
CES-type utility function may thus be suitable. While it is not easy to solve this kind
of model analytically, we may be able to carry out a numerical simulation.
While this study assumes that labor unions cause unemployment, other causes are
also posited, as in the efficient wage hypothesis and search hypothesis. However, it is
not possible to articulate which hypothesis explains real unemployment, and further
research is required to examine these hypotheses. If the other hypothesis holds, then
the optimal policy may change. For example, if the search-matching hypothesis holds,
the optimal policy may be the fluidization of the labor market. This essential research
will form a part of our future work.
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